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This Essay explores the relationship between second-look sentencing and 
retributive theory by focusing on the primary vehicle for authorizing and 
distributing punishment in most American jurisdictions: criminal 
legislation.  Looking beyond debates over the import of evolving norms to 
desert judgments, the Essay argues that the central retributive issue 
presented by second-look policies is whether the long-term punishments 
imposed by criminal courts comport with the proportionality standards of 
any period.  Using the District of Columbia’s criminal statutes as a case 
study, the Essay explains how three pervasive legislative flaws—statutory 
overbreadth, mandatory minima, and offense overlap—combine to 
support (and in some instances require) extreme sentences for actors of 
comparatively minimal blameworthiness.  The Essay argues that this 
finding, when viewed in light of the structural forces driving prosecutorial 
and judicial decision-making, provides reason to doubt the systemic 
proportionality of the severe punishments meted out in the District, as well 
as in other jurisdictions that suffer from similar legislative and structural 
problems.  It also explains why this epistemic uncertainty supports 
authorizing courts to reevaluate (and in appropriate cases reduce) severe 
punishments through second-look sentencing reform—both in the District 




Should we reevaluate the sentences of those we incarcerate for long periods of 
time for serious (and often violent) crimes?  That is the question at the heart of the 
debate surrounding second-look sentencing, which affords a prisoner an opportunity 
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to petition the court for a sentencing reduction after serving a fixed period of his or 
her sentence—typically, in the range of 10–20 years.1 
The idea of judicially reevaluating lengthy sentences is not new.2  But it has 
been newly invigorated by the recently completed Model Penal Code Sentencing 
Project, which recommends affording courts the authority “to hear and rule upon 
applications for modification of sentence from prisoners who have served 15 years 
of any sentence of imprisonment.”3  In an era of mass incarceration and massive 
prison expenditures, the American Law Institute’s recommendation has garnered 
significant interest at the state and federal level.4  And yet, as is so often the case in 
this criminal justice reform moment, attention and enthusiasm have yet to yield 
policy change—while the idea has also attracted significant pushback from 
prosecutors.5 
The problem is in part a product of moral disagreement.  Proponents of second-
look sentencing tend to focus on the ways in which reevaluating—and in appropriate 
cases, reducing—long-term sentences promotes overall societal welfare, 
highlighting, for example, the potential benefits to public safety,6 rehabilitation, the 
preservation of families, the efficient use of government resources, 7  and the 
 
1   See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. at 567 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017); Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Another Look at Second-Look Sentencing, 81 BROOK. 
L. REV. 149, 149 (2015).  
2   See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Second Looks & Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 90 
(2019) (“A second look at reducing the sentence of someone who violated the criminal law has deep 
roots in American law.”); Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for 
Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 152 (2014). 
3   MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 2017).  
After much deliberation, the ALI opted to articulate this provision through general “principles for 
legislation” incorporated into an appendix, rather than through “recommended black-letter statutory 
language” codified in the main text.  Id., cmt. at 567.  The ALI pursued this route “because the provision 
envisions new institutional arrangements for prison-release decisions that have not been tested in 
practice.”  Id.  
4   See, e.g., ABA Roundtable on “Second Look” Sentencing Reforms, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 149, 
149–225 (2009); Memorandum #25 from the D.C. Crim. Code Reform Comm’n to Advisory Group 
Members (Sept. 23, 2019), https://ccrc.dc.gov/node/1432631.  
5   See Michael Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Jan. 23, 
2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/01/23/taking-a-second-look-at-injustice-by-michael-
serota/ (discussing the political controversy involving prosecutorial lobbying efforts against second-
look sentencing in the District of Columbia); infra Part I. 
6   This is due to the criminogenic effect of prison, which is the idea that long sentences of 
incarceration can actually increase the probability a person will engage in future crimes.  See, e.g., 
Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME 
& JUST. 115, 125–26 (2009). 
7   One reason for this increased efficiency is the fact that recidivism rates decline markedly 
with age.  See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, Sentenced to Life: Penal Reform and the Most Severe Sanctions, 
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 378 (2013); see also Tina Chiu, It’s About Time: Aging Prisoners, 
Increasing Costs and Geriatric Release, VERA INST. OF JUST.  (Apr. 2010), https://www.vera.org/
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effective integration of prisoners into their communities. 8   But these forward-
looking, utilitarian objectives are materially different than the backward-looking, 
retributive conception of justice at the heart of much criminal law theory and 
community sentiment on matters of liability and punishment.9  As a deontological 
matter, the primary goal of sentencing is proportionality, which requires punishment 
to be scaled in accordance with the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct and 
his or her state of mind at the time the crime was committed.10 
From this retributive vantage point, there appears to be little that second-look 




8   See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 2; Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding 
the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 465 (2010). 
9   See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford 
University Press, 2010); GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford University Press, 2019); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, 
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Michael Serota, 
Proportional Mens Rea and the Future of Criminal Code Reform, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1201 
(2017).  
The boundaries of retributivism are contested; however, for purposes of this Essay it suffices to 
understand the term as signifying “a broad tradition or group of theories that regards desert as the 
central concept to be analyzed and preserved in efforts to justify punishment and the penal law that 
authorizes its infliction.”  Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 450 (2012).  See also id. at 453 (“Despite their considerable differences, all desert 
theorists place the principle of proportionality near the heart of retributive justice.”). 
10  See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 9, at ch. 3; Husak, supra note 9, at 453; see also Gideon Yaffe, 
Mens Rea by the Numbers, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 393, 401 (2018) (discussing the “division between 
deontic moral properties of acts—such as rightness, wrongness, permissibility, impermissibility, and 
so on—and evaluative moral properties of acts—such as goodness, badness, and so on”). 
In this paper, I use the term “proportionality” as interchangeable with “desert,” eliding potential 
differences—not implicated here—for purposes of simplicity and accessibility.  See, e.g., ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1 (2005) 
(treating the terms “proportionate” and “deserved” interchangeably in the punishment context); Mary 
Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
561, 563 (2006) (“Retributivism . . . is centrally concerned with the imposition of suffering in 
proportion to an offender’s moral desert.”); see also YAFFE, supra note 9, at 117 (observing that “the 
concept of proportionality might, in the end, just be the concept of desert”).  
By proportionality, I mean retributive proportionality, in contrast to the possibility of utilitarian 
proportionality.  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the 
Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 593 (2005); cf. Ewing 
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Proportionality . . . is inherently a 
concept tied to the penological goal of retribution.”).  The contours of retributive proportionality are 
further discussed infra Part V. 
For insightful discussions of the concept of blameworthiness, see T.M. SCANLON, MORAL 
DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME, ch. 4 (Harvard University Press, 2008), and the many 
contributions to D. JUSTIN COATES & NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI, BLAME: ITS NATURE & NORMS (Oxford 
University Press, 2018).  
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of the Model Penal Code ground their case for reevaluating long-term sentences on 
“[t]he prospect of evolving norms, which might render a proportionate prison 
sentence of one time period disproportionate in the next.”11  However, upon closer 
consideration, it’s unclear whether contemporary norms offer a better guide for 
ensuring the proportionality of prior sentencing judgments. 12   For example, 
“[h]istory demonstrates that many of our moral views about criminal sentences are 
cyclical in nature; rather than evolving toward leniency—or in some other 
direction—Americans’ views of offenses like drug use and sexual assault vacillate 
between very serious and not so serious.”13  And if that’s true, then the vicissitudes 
of public morality may offer “little persuasive reason” to believe that “new 
sentencers will reach more accurate conclusions on offense seriousness than the 
original sentencers in any given case.”14 
While this debate over the import of evolving norms to desert judgments is 
fascinating, it arguably overlooks a more fundamental question at the intersection of 
retributive theory and second-look sentencing: how secure should we feel in the 
systemic justice of the long-term punishments dispensed a decade or more ago by 
American courts—under any measure of proportionality? Which is to say, rather 
than focusing on which era’s perspective on morality is right, we should instead take 
seriously the possibility that the long-term sentences implicated by second-look 
policies might not meet the conception of retributive justice of any period at all. 
Indeed, the pathologies surrounding criminal justice policymaking provide us 
with little reason to expect our democratic process to yield proportionate sentencing 
outputs. 15   One cause for concern is political: legislators confront hydraulic 
pressure—stemming from the horrors of the daily news cycle—to pass superfluous 
statutes of increasing severity that are divorced from the kind of considered 
judgments of comparative blameworthiness at the heart of retributive 
proportionality.16  But an even greater problem is ideological: many legislators have 
 
11  As the drafters proceed to highlight:  
[Recent] flux in community attitudes toward many drug offenses, homosexual acts as 
criminal offenses, and even crime categories as grave as homicide, such as when a battered 
spouse kills an abusive husband, or cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide.  Looking more 
deeply into the American past, witchcraft, heresy, adultery, the sale and consumption of 
alcohol, and the rendering of aid to fugitive slaves were all at one time thought to be serious 
offenses.  
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6, cmt. at 567 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 2017).  
12  See Ryan, supra note 1, at 151. 
13  Id.  
14  Id.  
15  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505 (2001); RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS 
INCARCERATION, ch. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
16  See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American 
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?  The 
Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of 
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endorsed the notion that we can effectively deter and incapacitate simply by 
increasing the grading of, and penalties attached to, individual offenses.17  Not only 
does this widespread idea lack empirical support,18 but it supports a distribution of 
punishment that—at least in theory—is in direct conflict with the goal of 
proportionality.19  
Whether or not this conflict is actually borne out in a jurisdiction’s sentencing 
judgments is central to framing the debate over second-look sentencing.  In a penal 
system comprised of perfectly just punishment, one in which we have little basis to 
question the proportionality of the original judgments rendered, there would likely 
be little retributive benefit—and potentially significant cost—to reevaluating (and 
reducing) long-term sentences a decade or more after their initial imposition.  But 
as the reality of a system drifts farther from this ideal, and the possibility of pervasive 
and identifiable disproportionality grows, the retributive calculus surrounding 
enactment of second-look provisions begins to look very different.20  In that case, 
these policies may at some point afford courts—and by proxy their legislative 
principals 21 —an opportunity to materially diminish the overall level of 
disproportionality in the criminal justice system, while at the same time furthering a 
broad range of utilitarian values through measured sentencing reductions. 
This Essay explores the prospect of retributively disproportionate punishment 
in America and its implications for second-look sentencing reform by focusing on 
the primary vehicle for authorizing and distributing punishment in most 
jurisdictions: criminal legislation.  Using the District of Columbia’s criminal statutes 
as a case study, I explain how pervasive legislative flaws—characteristic of criminal 
codes around the country—provide grounds for questioning the systemic 
proportionality of long-term punishments meted out by courts.  The paper also 
explains why this epistemic uncertainty offers a compelling reason to authorize 
 
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).  For further discussion of proportionate 
sentencing, see infra Part V. 
17  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200 (2019); Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its 
Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).  
18  For good overviews of the current state of social science research on deterrence and 
incapacitation, see generally COUNCIL OF ECON.  ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2016); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES (2014). 
19  See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 19 (1987); BARKOW, supra note 15, at ch. 2. 
20  Cf. Ryan, supra note 1, at 172 (“Neglect of the parsimony principle in the initial sentencing 
of an offender is an example of an instance in which a second look at a sentence may be justified under 
a retributive framework.  In this case and others, the passage of time between the commission of the 
offense and the determination of punishment could sometimes be [retributively] useful . . . .”).  
21  See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 
101 CAL. L. REV. 699, 748 (2013). 
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courts to reevaluate (and in appropriate cases reduce) long-term punishments 
through second-look sentencing reform. 
 Part I provides an overview of the District of Columbia’s local criminal justice 
system, explaining how it is a microcosm for policy trends nationwide, including the 
current debate over second-look sentencing reform.  Thereafter, Part II provides an 
overview of the central role that criminal legislation plays in the District’s 
sentencing policy, highlighting three systemic flaws from which the District’s 
criminal statutes suffer: statutory overbreadth, mandatory minima, and offense 
overlap.  
Parts III and IV use these three legislative flaws—as they arise under the D.C. 
Code—as the basis for illustrating the ways in which criminal statutes regularly 
authorize, and in some instances require, the imposition of extreme sentences upon 
actors of comparatively minimal blameworthiness.  (Part III focuses on statutory 
overbreadth and mandatory minima, while Part IV centers on offense overlap.)  
Part V then considers the implications of this finding.  When viewed in light of 
the structural forces driving prosecutorial and judicial decision-making, these 
legislative flaws provide reason to doubt the systemic proportionality of the long-
term punishments meted out in the District, as well as in other jurisdictions that 
suffer from similar legislative and structural problems.22  I then explain why this 
epistemic uncertainty supports authorizing courts to reevaluate (and in appropriate 
cases reduce) long-term punishments through second-look sentencing reform—both 
in the District of Columbia and beyond. 
 
 
I. CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND LEGISLATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
The District of Columbia’s local criminal justice system has long reflected our 
national conversation on matters of crime and punishment.23  Physically proximate 
to the Department of Justice and the federal policy apparatus that surrounds it, the 
District’s local criminal justice system is also helmed by the federally run U.S. 
 
22  There are, of course, many other reasons (aside from flawed criminal legislation) to doubt 
the retributive justice of long-term sentences in America—most obvious is their disproportionate 
impact on underserved minority communities.  See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1st ed., 2017); Paul 
Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 
GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016).  The legislative arguments presented in this Essay are not intended to supplant 
these critiques, and, as discussed infra Part V, they are actually complementary to them given the 
influence of cognitive bias on prosecutorial decision-making, see generally Rachel E. Barkow, 
Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 
(2013), as well as on judicial decision-making, see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et. al., Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).  
23  For an insightful account of the history and development of local criminal justice politics in 
the District of Columbia, see FORMAN, supra note 22; see also James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of 
Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012). 
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Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO-DC), which prosecutes—
and, through historically robust lobbying efforts, helps to shape—most of the 
District’s local felony offenses.24   
Since the passage of Home Rule in 1973, the District’s local legislative 
authority, the D.C. Council, has exercised primary responsibility over D.C. criminal 
justice policy (supplanting the U.S. Congress); however, the federal influence over 
local matters of crime and punishment has persisted.25  This is well illustrated by the 
tough-on-crime sentencing policies the Council enacted—often working in lockstep 
with USAO-DC—during the late nineties and early aughts.  This group of policies, 
which includes “Truth-in-Sentencing,”26 the abolition of parole, and the adoption of 
severe mandatory minima, mirrored similarly severe policy trends around the 
nation.27    
During a time of both high crime rates and punitive public attitudes, this type 
of approach to legislating crime may have made a certain kind of democratic sense.  
But the District’s leaders and residents—like those in so many other jurisdictions—
have since come face to face with these policies’ destructive and disparate impact 
on the social fabric and well-being of minority communities (which constitute a 
majority in the District).28  Informed by the recent surge in criminal justice data and 
research, the D.C. Council has more recently begun to chart a different path by 
enacting reform-oriented legislation that is a better fit with both the city’s liberal 
politics and its technocratic approach to governance.  Yet this has also put the 
District’s elected officials in periodic conflict with USAO-DC, which has long had 
an anti-reform mindset that has only become more pronounced under the current 
presidential administration. 
Perhaps nowhere is this conflict, or the corrosive political dynamics underlying 
it, more pronounced than in the present debate over second-look sentencing reform 
in the District.  In 2016, the D.C. Council passed the Incarceration Reduction 
 
24  The Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (OAG) also serves in a 
prosecutorial capacity, with jurisdiction over juveniles for nearly all crimes, as well as over “adults 
who commit certain criminal offenses.”  Office of the Att’y Gen., Criminal Section, OAG (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2020), https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/public-safety-division/criminal-
section (describing the “five primary categories of criminal offenses” prosecuted by OAG). 
25  See The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93–198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. Code § 1–201.01 et seq.). 
26  That is, the requirement that prisoners serve 85%—or some other fixed and significant 
portion—of their sentences.  See generally Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and 
Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 75 (1999). 
27  See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Amendment Act of 2000, D.C. CODE § 13–302 (1981); Turner 
et al., supra note 26. 
28  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Making Connections with the Wire: Telling the Stories Behind 
the Statistics, 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 26 (2018) (“In the District of Columbia, more than 75% of 
black men can expect to be incarcerated during their lives.”); FORMAN, supra note 22, at 38. 
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Amendment Act (“IRAA”), which affords those incarcerated for serious crimes 
committed before the age of eighteen the opportunity to ask judges to reconsider—
and, where appropriate, reduce—their sentences after they spend at least fifteen 
years in prison.29  To grant these requests, judges are required to conclude that, in 
light of a range of factors, “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any person 
or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.”30  
The court’s determination must also be reduced to a written opinion “stating the 
reasons for granting or denying the application,”31 which is subject to review under 
“well-established standards of reasonableness.”32 
After two years of successful implementation, the chair of the D.C. Council’s 
Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety, Charles Allen, began working on a 
bill that would expand the IRAA’s modest reach.33  Introduced in February 2019, 
the Second Look Amendment Act (“SLAA”) simply increases the age of eligibility 
under the IRAA from 18 to 25 at the time of the crime. 34  Initially, the SLAA 
received little attention.  But that all changed in July 2019 when, after months of 
silence, USAO-DC responded with an aggressive public lobbying campaign 
opposing the bill.35  In September, that campaign reached a crescendo with the 
Office’s inaccurate assertion that the District has one of the lowest incarceration 
rates in the nation36—when in reality, the District of Columbia has one of the highest 
incarceration rates in the country. 37   USAO-DC has since retracted this 
misstatement; however, the Office nevertheless continues to misrepresent other 
 
29  D.C. CODE § 24-403.03(2) (2019). 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Williams v. United States, 205 A.3d 837, 854 (D.C. 2019). 
33  See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, A Trump-Appointed Prosecutor Is Lobbying Against D.C.’s 
Modest Criminal Justice Reform, SLATE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08
/us-attorney-jessie-liu-dc-juvenile-criminal-justice-reform.html. 
34  See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, D.C. is Considering Giving More Prisoners a Chance for Early 




35  See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Push to Allow Some Violent Criminals a Chance at Early 




36  Stern, supra note 33 (quoting USAO-DC prosecutor’s statement that “the District of 
Columbia has the lowest incarceration rate in the country”). 
37  Fact: DC Has a Mass Incarceration Problem, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/fact-dc-mass-incarceration-problem/.  
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aspects of the legislation, and still appears to be very much against affording judges 
expanded discretion to reevaluate lengthy prison sentences.38  
Throughout the debate, proponents of the SLAA have largely focused on the 
utilitarian case for second-look sentencing policies, placing significant emphasis on 
the rehabilitative potential of those who commit crimes in their youth due to their 
ongoing state of cognitive development.39  In contrast, the SLAA’s opponents have 
sought to capitalize on both Willie Horton-style scare tactics40 and crude retributive 
rhetoric, such as, for example, dismissing “a lot of talk about the brain science and 
the concern for [defendants] who are 16 to 24 years old” by highlighting the 
frequently young victims, whose “16- to 24-year-old brains were never developing 
because they’re being prematurely snuffed out by violence that we need to be doing 
more to stop.”41  Rarely mentioned, though, is anything related to the scope, severity, 
or nature of the policies that actually authorized (and in some instances required) the 
imposition of the long-term sentences that the SLAA would subject to reevaluation, 
namely, the District’s criminal statutes.  This is a significant oversight for the reasons 
laid out in the next Part.  
 
 
38  Specifically, the Office says that the law eliminates a judge’s ability to consider the nature 
of the crime when deciding whether to reduce a sentence; however, “nothing in the law prevents judges 
from engaging in such consideration, and several provisions still in force effectively require them to 
do just that.” James Forman, Jr., Justice sometimes needs a do-over, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/local-opinions/justice-sometimes-needs-a-do-over/2019
/09/20/4216161a-d665-11e9-86ac-0f250cc91758_story.html (citing Brief, Stewart v. United States, in 
which USAO-DC encouraged the presiding judge to consider the defendant’s crime because it is 
“essential context for evaluating other factors that remain relevant under the IRAA”). 
Aside from the Office’s tactics, there are a number of grounds on which one might object to DC-
USAO—a federal agency helmed by a presidentially-appointed U.S. Attorney—interfering with local 
D.C. criminal justice reform efforts, including: (1) the absence of democratic representation, see Ethan 
J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 95 (2013); (2) the disruption of a meaningful dialogue between local legislators 
and their constituents, see Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota, & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and 
the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1141 (2014); and (3) the stifling of a valuable laboratory of 
experimentation, see Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Maintaining Healthy Laboratories of 
Experimentation: Federalism, Health Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CAL. L. REV. 557, 568 (2011). 
39  See, e.g., Martin Austermuhle, A Bill That Could Let Young Violent Offenders Out Of Prison 
Early Is Dividing D.C. Officials, Feds, DCIST (Aug. 22, 2019) https://dcist.com/story/19/08/22/a-bill-
that-could-let-young-violent-offenders-out-of-prison-early-is-dividing-d-c-officials-feds/ (noting 
arguments). 
40  See generally Rachel Withers, George H.W. Bush’s “Willie Horton” Ad Will Always Be the 
Reference Point for Dog-Whistle Racism, VOX (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/1/
18121221/george-hw-bush-willie-horton-dog-whistle-politics. 
41  Stern, supra note 36 (quoting USAO-DC prosecutor). 
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II. DISTRIBUTING PUNISHMENT THROUGH CRIMINAL LEGISLATION 
 
Criminal statutes—both in the District and elsewhere—define the elements of 
crimes, thereby drawing the line between criminal and non-criminal conduct.42  And 
they also set the minimum and maximum punishments governing offenses, while 
making morally salient distinctions between different forms of conduct.43  The latter 
function is one of grading, which is the primary mechanism that policymakers have 
at their disposal to ensure a proportionate distribution of punishment. 44   By 
specifying the relative penal import of variances in social harm and accompanying 
states of mind, a legislative grading scheme provides sentencing courts with critical 
direction in determining where the upper and lower bounds of punishment lie for 
any given offense.45   
This is not to say that legislative grading schemes are all that matter for 
purposes of facilitating proportionate sentencing.  Sentencing guidelines also have 
an important role to play (at least in theory) by both fine-tuning and filling in critical 
details—it is very difficult, after all, for the legislature to address the comparative 
relevance of the whole spectrum of factors bearing on a criminal actor’s 
blameworthiness.46  That said, sentencing guidelines are not particularly well suited 
to making significant course corrections to legislative grading determinations.47  
Nor, as a matter of sentencing practice, do they really try to; instead, their primary 
function tends to be one of fitting variations in criminal history within preexisting 
legislative grading judgments.48  This is particularly true in a jurisdiction such as the 
District of Columbia that merely has advisory sentencing guidelines, which are 
legally unenforceable,49 incorporate wide sentencing ranges,50 and are exceptionally 
malleable.51 
 
42  See Serota, supra note 9, at 1214–16. 
43  See id. 
44  See id. at 1210–13. 
45  See id. 
46  See id. at 1218–19. 
47  See id. 
48  See id. 
49  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 3-105(c) (2007) (D.C. Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines (DCVSG) “. 
. . shall not create any legally enforceable rights in any party . . .”); Speaks v. United States, 959 A.2d 
712, 718 (D.C. 2008). 
50  See D.C. SENT’G AND CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL App’x A—Master Grid (2015) (enumerating top and bottom of each box on the sentencing 
grid). 
51  Consider just two examples.  First, the Guidelines authorize judges to depart upwards from 
the already broad recommended sentencing range based on “manifest injustice” or in the presence of a 
fact, “comparable in gravity” to a list of ten other facts, that “aggravates substantially the seriousness 
of the offense or the defendant’s culpability.”  DCVSG § 5.2.2(10), (11).  See also D.C. SENT’G 
COMM’N, EVALUATION OF THE D.C. VOLUNTARY SENT’G GUIDELINES 28 (Mar. 24, 2017) (finding that, 
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In light of these attributes, the D.C. criminal code effectively provides the 
blueprint for punishment in the District.  So it offers a useful gauge for evaluating 
the overarching proportionality of the sentences imposed by the trial judges on the 
D.C. Superior Court.  But this is disconcerting—because even a cursory look at that 
blueprint raises significant warning signs.  For one thing, local crime legislation in 
the District is the product of two overlapping legislative bodies: the U.S. Congress 
and the D.C. Council, which together have enacted countless statutory offenses.52  
Beyond that, the District is one of a minority of American jurisdictions that has never 
enacted a modern recodification of its criminal offenses (though one is in the 
works).53  It is therefore unsurprising that the D.C. criminal code has been ranked as 
one of the worst in the nation.54  There are many reasons for this ranking, but central 
to the discussion of proportionate sentencing in this Essay are three foundational 
flaws. 
 
(1)  Statutory overbreadth.  The first problem is statutory overbreadth, 
which arises when a criminal law is drafted too broadly and therefore 
subjects individuals who do not deserve to be held liable for an 
offense to the same range of sentencing consequences applicable to 
the most blameworthy actors covered by that offense. 
(2)  Mandatory minima.  The second problem is mandatory minima, 
which take away judicial discretion to individualize sentences for any 
actor whose conduct meets the threshold definition of an offense.  
When paired with an overbroad offense definition, mandatory 
minima effectively require the imposition of severe sentences upon 
those who are not even deserving of a conviction—let alone lengthy 
incarceration—for violation of a particular criminal statute. 
(3)  Offense overlap.  The third problem is offense overlap, which enables 
the aggregation of convictions and sentencing exposure—i.e., the 
 
between 2010 and 2015, 7.1% of sentences departed from Guidelines recommendations, and that in 
nearly 73% of these cases, courts did not even cite a departure reason).  Second, the Guidelines are 
silent on whether the sentences for two or more substantially related violent offenses committed in a 
single course of conduct should be run consecutively or concurrently.  See DCVSG § 6.1, 6.2 (stating 
rules of consecutive and concurrent sentencing, which are conspicuously silent on this issue).  
The extent of the unguided policy discretion that results from this silence is illustrated by the 
discussion of offense overlap, infra Part IV. 
52  See generally D.C. CRIM. CODE REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 1: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
ENACTMENT OF D.C. CODE TITLE 22 AND OTHER CHANGES TO CRIMINAL STATUTES (May 5, 2017), 
http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/38043/RC22-0053-Introduction.pdf. 
53  See D.C. CODE § 3-152 (2019) (requiring D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission to 
develop comprehensive revisions of criminal statutes).  
54  See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five 
Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 60 (2000) (ranking the D.C. criminal code as 
45th out of 52 American criminal codes). 
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statutory minimum, which is sometimes mandatory, and statutory 
maximum punishments—for violating substantially related criminal 
statutes under circumstances that involve commission of what is 
intuitively considered a single offense. 
 
The next two Parts of this Essay will explore these problems by analyzing 
District statutes relevant to robbery and carjacking; however, it is important to note 
at the outset that this legislative exploration is only intended to be illustrative and 
that these same fundamental problems pervade the District’s entire body of criminal 
legislation. 
 
III. STATUTORY OVERBREADTH & MANDATORY MINIMA 
 
A good place to start the analysis is with the District’s overbroad, century-old 
robbery statute, which was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1901 but is still routinely 
charged today.55  Typically, robbery is considered a violent offense, involving theft 
of property paired with the use or threat of force against a person.  This is not the 
case in the District, whose robbery statute “criminalizes non-violent conduct beyond 
generic robbery.”56  That idiosyncrasy stems from Congress’s decision to include 
the phrase “stealthy seizure” as an alternative basis for committing robbery, which 
District courts have subsequently interpreted as providing for liability in situations 
“where no actual force or violence is involved, and the owner is oblivious of the 
taking.”57   
This has led to the counterintuitive conclusion that non-violent acts such as 
pickpocketing58 or quickly stealing a bike in the vicinity of the victim59 constitute 
robbery in the District.  As a result, individuals who engage in these non-violent acts 
are subject to the same 15-year statutory maximum penalty otherwise applicable to 
the violent robber.  To be sure, District trial judges are not legally required to impose 
a 15-year sentence upon an actor who engages in non-violent theft from a person—
or even someone who commits a more serious form of robbery.60  But they are 
 
55  D.C. CODE § 22-2801 (2013). 
56  United States v. Villatoro-Medrano, 464 F. App’x 666, 667 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Leak v. 
United States, 757 A.2d 739, 742 (D.C. 2000)).   
57  Ulmer v. United States, 649 A.2d 295, 298 (D.C. 1994).  
58  Turner v. United States, 16 F.2d 535, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1926).   
59  Leak, 757 A.2d at 742–43. 
60  The District’s robbery statute is subject to a two-year statutory minimum; however, unlike a 
mandatory minimum, the sentencing court need not actually impose two years of incarceration to 
satisfy it.  See D.C. CODE § 22-2801 (2013). 
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authorized to do so, and very little—aside from social and professional norms—
stands in a judge’s way should he or she choose to do so.61 
This is in contrast to the District’s similarly overbroad carjacking statute, which 
subjects robbery-like conduct (involving a motor vehicle) to a 7-year mandatory 
minimum sentence accompanied by a 21-year statutory maximum.62  The D.C. 
Council passed the relevant legislation during the peak of the tough-on-crime era in 
response to a particularly heinous incident involving a violent car theft that 
culminated in the victim’s death while being dragged behind her car.63  Hastily 
drafted statutes enacted in response to newsworthy events are notoriously 
problematic, and this one is no exception.64 
To begin, the statute was drafted in terms nearly identical to the robbery statute, 
allowing for “stealthy seizure” carjacking liability.65  So again, although carjacking 
is typically thought of as a violent offense, the District’s carjacking statute applies 
without regard to whether any force was used, such as, for example, where the 
defendant jumps in the victim’s car at a gas station and drives away while the owner 
has his back turned.66  At the same time, the District’s carjacking legislation is in 
important ways even broader than the robbery statute.  For example, it incorporates 
an alternative “attempts” element into the offense definition.  Thus, a person who 
merely tries, unsuccessfully, to steal a car in the District in the vicinity of its owner 
would—absent any force or even the threat of force—be subject to a guaranteed 
minimum of 7 years, with the potential of receiving three times that amount. 
And this is merely the sentencing exposure confronting an unarmed vehicular 
thief under the District’s carjacking statute.67  Indeed, however harsh a 7 to 21 year 
range may seem for what is (as defined) a non-violent offense, the severity grows 
exponentially once a weapon is introduced into the equation.  That’s due to the 
District’s overbroad set of armed enhancements and aggravators, which apply new 
mandatory minima and statutory maxima to “crimes of violence” or “dangerous 
crimes” committed “while armed” with a “dangerous weapon.” 68   Each of the 
 
61  Given the voluntary nature of the District’s sentencing guidelines, the only legally 
enforceable check on the District’s local trial judges imposing the most severe statutorily authorized 
punishment possible is the Eighth Amendment; however, the judiciary’s actual role in constitutionally 
policing disproportionate non-capital sentences has been described as “virtually nonexistent.”  Rachel 
E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the 
Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009). 
62  D.C. CODE § 22-2803(a)(2) (2013). 
63  See COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON BILL 10–16, Carjacking 
Prevention Amendment Act of 1993, at 3 (Feb. 25, 1993). 
64  See Beale, supra note 16, at 44–52. 
65  D.C. CODE § 22-2803(a)(1) (2013). 
66  These are the facts in Young v. United States, 111 A.3d 13, 14 (D.C. 2015). 
67  As explained infra Part IV, an unarmed carjacker would actually face a statutory maximum 
much greater than 21 years due to the consequences stemming from offense overlap. 
68  E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4502 (2017). 
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foregoing phrases is placed in quotes because none reflects its common meaning.  
Instead, all incorporate a technical, legal definition that reaches far beyond an 
intuitive understanding, thereby incorporating significant—and consequential—
overbreadth into the D.C. Code. 
Perhaps most obvious is that the statutory classifications of “crimes of 
violence” and “dangerous crimes” encompass numerous offenses—such as the 
District’s robbery and carjacking statutes, as well as the District’s low threshold drug 
distribution statute69—that do not require proof of violence or dangerousness to 
establish their core elements. 70   Beyond that, many objects that one might not 
necessarily think of as a “dangerous weapon”—for example, sneakers71 or teeth72—
are covered by exceptionally broad judicial constructions of the phrase.  And, most 
significant, the object at issue need not even be employed for the enhancement or 
aggravator to apply; rather, a “dangerous weapon” that is “readily available” will 
suffice under the plain terms of the relevant statutes.73  
To illustrate how these problems intersect, return again to the example 
involving the stealthy, non-violent theft of a motor vehicle being filled with gas by 
its owner.  Imagine that the defendant was wearing a backpack containing an 
unloaded firearm—or even a box cutter—at the moment he jumped into the victim’s 
vehicle.  In that case, the defendant would satisfy the elements of the aggravated 
offense of armed carjacking, based on his or her having a “readily available” weapon 
in the legal sense required by the statute.74  And this, in turn, would subject the 
defendant to a guaranteed 15-year sentence under that statute’s enhanced mandatory 
minimum, as well as the prospect of 40 years of statutorily authorized maximum 
punishment.75 
So far, we’ve only considered problems at the intersection of explicit statutory 
overbreadth and mandatory minima.  However, by focusing on the broad meaning 
of the terms employed in a criminal statute, one misses another critical way that 
legislatures authorize—and, where mandatory minima are at issue, require—courts 
to impose extreme sentences: by saying nothing at all.  This stems from the fact that 
statutory offenses exist within a broader universe of general principles of criminal 
responsibility (sometimes codified, sometimes supplied by the common law), which 
 
69  See id. at § 48-904.01(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2015) (possession with intent to distribute any amount 
of controlled substance subject to 30-year statutory maximum).  
70  See id. at §§ 23-1331(3)–(4) (2013) (listing “crimes of violence” and “dangerous crime”). 
71  Arthur v. United States, 602 A.2d 174, 179 (D.C. 1992). 
72  In re D.T., 977 A.2d 346, 355 (D.C. 2009). 
73  E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4502 (2017).  This would apply even when an actor deliberately 
chooses not to use the weapon. 
74  Id. at § 22-2803(b)(1) (2013). 
75  Id. at § 22-2803(b)(2) (2013).  
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are read into an offense definition in the absence of an explicit legislative statement 
to the contrary.76 
The clearest example is supplied by principles of legal accountability that 
broadly allow for an accomplice or co-conspirator—however peripheral—to be 
treated as though he or she directly committed any crime upon proof of having 
purposely assisted with, or conspired in, its commission.77  In practice, this means 
that serving as a getaway driver, lending a hand in preparation, or providing words 
of encouragement to another person who directly engages in the least blameworthy 
conduct covered by a given offense is sufficient to open the supporting actor to full 
liability and punishment for that offense.78    
A more subtle, but equally significant, source of implicit statutory overbreadth 
is provided by what might be referred to as partial defenses, such as imperfect 
duress, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and diminished capacity (in its 
diminished responsibility form).79  Roughly speaking, these arise when a person 
commits an offense with a less blameworthy state of mind that is directly relevant 
to, but falls short of establishing, a complete excuse defense.80  The presence of these 
mitigating factors typically does not preclude proof of the narrow mental state 
requirement (e.g., purpose, knowledge, or recklessness) required by most criminal 
offenses; thus, they too are likely to fall within a statute’s implied breadth of 
coverage.81 
 To illustrate the sentencing import of implicit statutory overbreadth, consider 
another carjacking scenario: the defendant stops a driver at gunpoint and physically 
forces the victim out of the vehicle and onto the curb before driving away.  
Blameworthy conduct?  Unequivocally.  Does it merit the guaranteed 15-
year/potential 40-year sentencing range incorporated into the District’s carjacking 
statute?  Arguably not—at least when viewed in light of the District’s aggravated 
 
76  See generally, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Dynamic Incorporation of the General Part: Criminal 
Law’s Missing (Hyper)link, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1831 (2015). 
77  See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.01 (8th ed. 2018); Sanford 
H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
323, 337 (1985).  Note that, in many jurisdictions, a person who purposely assists with, or conspires 
in, the commission of one crime may be held fully responsible for any other reasonably foreseeable 
crimes committed by the principal actor—in the absence of the supporting actor’s subjective 
culpability—under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine (for accomplices) and Pinkerton 
doctrine (for co-conspirators).  See id.   
78  See sources cited supra note 77.   
79  See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Partial Defenses, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 311 
(2010); Husak, supra note 9, at 460–84; Serota, supra note 9, at 1215–16. 
80  See sources cited supra note 79. 
81  It bears notice that, in the District, it is difficult to identify the contours of any defense 
because the D.C. Code does not codify general defenses.  
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assault offense, which subjects the most horrific beatings short of death to a 
maximum of 10 years in prison, with no accompanying mandatory minimum.82   
The potential for disproportionate outcomes in the District’s carjacking statute 
becomes even clearer once one considers that the same 15 to 40-year sentencing 
range applies in the face of countless mitigating facts.  For example, the defendant 
might have been a 22-year-old suffering from a moderate intellectual disability.  Or 
perhaps the taking was an impulsive decision made by an emotionally distraught 
parent whose family had been recently evicted from public housing.  Alternatively, 
perhaps the defendant was either explicitly coerced to take the vehicle by a violent 
drug dealer as repayment for an outstanding debt, or implicitly coerced to take the 
vehicle as a safe refuge from the repeated sexual assaults she was subjected to at the 
homeless shelter where she resides.  Finally, we should also consider the possibility 
that the defendant didn’t take the vehicle at all, but merely assisted, encouraged, or 
conspired with someone who did (and who possessed one of these mitigated states 
of mind).  Under the District’s general principles of legal accountability, that 
defendant, too, could be convicted of carjacking, and therefore sentenced to 15 to 40 
years of imprisonment.83 
Having illustrated how statutory overbreadth can facilitate disproportionate 
sentences for those who engage in classically violent acts, it is necessary to take the 
analysis one step further by discussing the most violent act of all: murder.  Arguably, 
any policy that affords those who have culpably taken an innocent life with an 
opportunity to request a more lenient punishment raises its own uniquely 
challenging set of political and moral considerations.  So it is worth considering just 
who counts as a murderer—and what that means for sentencing purposes—under 
the D.C. criminal code.  What one finds, perhaps unsurprisingly, are precisely the 
same kinds of problems discussed above. 
Consider the District’s first-degree murder offense, which subjects any person 
who “without purpose to do so kills another in perpetrating or in attempting to 
perpetrate” one of a number of offenses (including robbery) to a 30-year mandatory 
minimum sentence and the prospect of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
release.84  The overarching felony-murder policy reflected in this language can be 
summarized as follows: District defendants are held strictly liable for any death 
stemming from their underlying criminal act (that satisfies one of the qualifying 
offenses), without regard to their culpability as to the fatality, so long as it bears 
some causal connection to that act.85 
 
82  D.C. CODE § 22-404.01 (2013); see infra Part V for further discussion of the relevance of 
comparative assessments of proportionality.   
83  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1805 (2001) (accomplice liability statute); Gordon v. United States, 
783 A.2d 575, 582 (D.C. 2001) (recognizing judicial adoption of Pinkerton liability for co-
conspirators).  
84  D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001) (definition); D.C. CODE § 22-2104(a) (2013) (penalty).   
85  In re D.N., 65 A.3d 88, 92–93 (D.C. 2013) (citing Johnson v. United States, 671 A.2d 428, 
433 (D.C. 1995)). 
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By combining the well-documented overbreadth inherent in strict liability with 
the overbreadth specific to the District’s criminal statutes, this approach to felony 
murder supports a range of unintuitive outcomes.  To illustrate, consider a trio of 
fatal robbery scenarios, which each involve an accidental death occurring in the 
absence of a weapon or even the intentional infliction of physical harm. 
 
(1)  The defendant employs minimal force to grab a woman’s purse from 
her shoulder as he runs by.  As the purse is pulled off, the woman 
trips on a curb and suffers a fatal head injury. 
(2)  The defendant, armed with an imitation pistol, confronts an older man 
walking through an alley alone at night, and gently explains that if he 
hands over his wallet no harm will come to him.  The older man goes 
into shock and dies from a heart attack. 
(3)  The defendant jumps in a car being filled with gas at a gas station 
while the owner is looking in the other direction.  Thereafter, while 
driving away in the victim’s vehicle (at the speed limit), he kills a 
child who—by no fault of the defendant—runs into the street chasing 
a ball. 
 
Each of the above defendants lacked the intent to kill, let alone cause bodily 
injury.  Nevertheless, all could qualify as murderers under the D.C. criminal code, 
which would subject these actors to the mandatory 30 years to life sentencing range 
attached to the District’s felony murder statute.  And again, the same could also be 
true of any individual—however peripheral—who purposely assisted with, 
encouraged, or conspired in the commission of the defendant’s unintentionally fatal 
conduct.  Because under general principles of legal accountability, accomplices and 





Insofar as retributive proportionality is concerned, the most distressing thing 
that can be said about the analysis so far is that it only captures a relatively small 
piece of the sentencing exposure confronting the criminal defendants discussed 
above.  The reason?  Because it focuses solely on the liability arising under the most 
serious offense when, in reality, criminal defendants—both in the District and 
elsewhere—rarely are charged with only the most serious offense.  Rather, they 
typically confront multiple charges for substantially related offenses for which the 
convictions and sentencing consequences are aggregated.  This is due to the 
pervasive statutory flaw of offense overlap explored in the next Part.  
 
 
86  In re D.N., 65 A.3d at 93 (citing Butler v. United States, 614 A.2d 875, 886 (D.C. 1992)). 
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IV. OVERLAPPING OFFENSES  
 
The problem of offense overlap arises from the following tension: criminal 
codes can cover nearly all forms of wrongdoing with a relatively limited (if carefully 
drafted) set of offenses; however, elected officials are under tremendous pressure to 
act in the face of tragedy, and there is arguably no easier way to do so than to pass 
superfluous criminal statutes. 87   The unfortunate outcome of this “pathological 
politics,” which has touched every jurisdiction in the nation, are criminal codes 
replete with related offenses that repetitively criminalize very similar harms.88  Here 
again, the District’s carjacking statute provides an illustrative example.   
Certainly, the heinous act motivating passage of the carjacking legislation was 
already subject to liability and punishment for robbery and kidnapping (among other 
offenses).89  Nevertheless, a tragedy of this nature cries out for a response, which 
the enactment of a new and punitive carjacking offense seemed to provide—not only 
as an expression of support for the victim but as a means of protecting the 
community from the recurrence of similar conduct.90  But there is a basic problem 
with this intuitive legislative logic: we have very little reason to believe that 
ratcheting up already severe penalties in this way—whether for carjacking or any 
other offense—effectively deters others from engaging in the proscribed conduct.91  
What the D.C. Council surely did (unintentionally) accomplish, though, was the 
disproportionate multiplication of convictions and punishments for what is 
intuitively considered a single criminal act.  To understand why, it is necessary to 
mention the role of one other legal actor: the courts.   
The District’s local appellate court, the D.C. Court of Appeals, like many others 
around the country, has opted to address issues of offense overlap—referred to as 
“merger” in the judicial context—through the exceedingly narrow (and therefore 
punitive) elements test.92  The central question presented by merger is: how should 
the court deal with multiple convictions for substantially related criminal offenses 
arising from a single course of conduct—namely, should the lesser conviction(s) 
merge (and therefore be vacated)? The response provided by the elements test is: 
 
87  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 15–16. 
88  See id.  
89  See infra notes 95–105 and accompanying text; see also Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (2005) (observing that “Congress has adopted repetitive and 
overlapping statutes,” such as “mostly superfluous offenses like ‘carjacking’ that deal with conduct 
addressed by existing provisions such as robbery and kidnapping”).   
90  See, e.g., Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 (1996). 
91  This is due to, among other reasons, how little would-be criminals actually know about 
criminal penalties.  See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & 
JUST. 1975 (2013).  For excellent discussions of this issue, and its political and policy implications, see 
sources cited supra note 17.  And for two helpful reference guides on the current state of research on 
deterrence and incapacitation, see sources cited supra note 18. 
92  See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386, 388 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). 
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vacate the lesser offense(s) when—but only when—it would be impossible to 
commit one without also committing the other (under any imaginable set of 
circumstances).93  The corollary is that where it is even theoretically possible to 
commit one offense without committing the other—say, for example, because of a 
technical distinction not implicated in the defendant’s case—then both convictions 
must remain and the sentencing consequences must be aggregated.94   
This formalistic approach to merger, when paired with the District’s broad and 
overlapping set of criminal statutes, subjects a vast array of questionably 
characterized “violent crimes” to the possibility of an effective life sentence.  To 
illustrate, reconsider the stealthy gas station theft successfully committed, without 
force or violence, by a defendant wearing a backpack storing an unloaded firearm.  
On these facts, the defendant would satisfy the requirements of liability for at least 
six offenses in the D.C. Code: (1) armed carjacking (15-year mandatory 
minimum/40-year statutory maximum);95 (2) robbery while armed (5 to 10-year 
mandatory minimum/45-year statutory maximum); 96  (3) felony theft (10-year 
statutory maximum);97 (4) unlawful use of a vehicle (5-year statutory maximum);98 
(5) possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (5-year mandatory 
minimum/15-year statutory maximum);99 and (6) carrying a pistol without a license 
(5-year statutory maximum).100  Due to narrow differences in statutory definition, 
none of these offenses would merge with any other under the elements test.101  The 
result? For commission of what is most aptly described as a non-violent vehicular 
 
93  See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for A 
Model Penal Code Second, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 599, 606 (2004); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double 
Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 596 (2006).  
94  Consider an illustrative example.  Although the District’s robbery and carjacking offenses 
employ nearly identical terminology, there are also some minor distinctions, such as the fact that the 
District’s carjacking statute requires the theft of a car but does not require success—whereas the 
robbery statute requires completed asportation, but not the theft of a car (stealing any property will 
suffice).  Stemming from these minor distinctions, it is therefore possible to commit carjacking—via 
an unsuccessful attempt to take possession of the victim’s vehicle—without committing robbery (which 
requires asportation); and it is also possible to commit robbery—via the theft of property other than a 
vehicle from another’s person—without committing carjacking.  As a result, these offenses would not 
merge under the elements test.  Pixley v. United States, 692 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1997).   
95  D.C. CODE § 22-2803(b)(1) (2013). 
96  See id. at § 22-2801 (2013) (robbery), § 22-4502 (2017) (while armed enhancement).   
97  Id. at § 22-3212(a) (2016). 
98  Id. at § 22-3215(d)(1) (2013). 
99  Id. at § 22-4504(b) (2015). 
100 Id. at § 22-4504(a)(1) (2015). 
101 See, e.g., Pixley, 692 A.2d at 440 (rejecting merger claim for carjacking and robbery); 
Foreman v. United States, 988 A.2d 505, 506 n.1 (D.C. 2010) (parties agreeing that felony theft is not 
a lesser-included offense of armed robbery); Stevenson v. United States, 760 A.2d 1034, 1035 (D.C. 
2000) (“[C]onvictions for PFCV do not merge into the predicate armed offenses.”); see also supra note 
94. 
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theft offense, this defendant would face an aggregate mandatory minimum of at least 
25 years, and a concomitant statutory maximum of well over a century.102 
This is only the beginning of the sentencing exposure implicated by the 
District’s overlapping offenses.  As the fact pattern veers closer toward what one 
might think of as a heartland, violent carjacking, both the number of convictions and 
aggregated liability grow greater yet.  Imagine, for example, that the defendant 
employed a violent threat to facilitate the carjacking (e.g., “hand over your car, or 
else”).  In that case, his conduct would support another non-merging conviction—
and an additional 20 years of potential prison time—under the District’s felony 
threats offense.103  Now consider the possibility that the driver resisted, thereby 
leading the defendant to forcefully remove the driver.  This would support yet 
another non-merging conviction—and an additional 30 years of potential prison 
time—under the District’s kidnapping offense.104  And finally, if, upon arrest, it 
turned out that the defendant’s backpack contained an amount of marijuana (or some 
other controlled substance) sufficient to persuade the factfinder of an intent to 
distribute, then that too would support another non-merging conviction—and an 
additional 30 years of potential prison time—under the District’s controlled 




It is worth reiterating that the goal of this analysis is not to illustrate the injustice 
of the District’s treatment of robbery, carjacking, or any of the other crimes analyzed 
above (though it may do that).  Rather, it is to highlight generalizable ways that the 
problems of statutory overbreadth, mandatory minima, and offense overlap 
converge to authorize—and in some instances require—the imposition of extreme 
sentences for conduct that is of comparatively minimal blameworthiness.  As I will 
explain in the next part of this Essay, this provides us with little confidence in the 
systemic proportionality of the District’s sentencing decisions (or those being 
imposed elsewhere). And it also offers a compelling reason to authorize courts to 
reevaluate (and in appropriate cases reduce) long-term punishments through second-
look sentencing reform, both in the District and beyond. 
 
 
102 Here, it is worth noting that, in general, District judges retain discretion to run sentences 
concurrently should they so choose, but are also encouraged to run them consecutively in many (if not 
most) cases.  See D.C. CODE § 23-112 (2001) (general default consecutive sentencing); D.C. Super. Ct. 
R. Crim. P. 32 (same); cf. D.C. CODE § 22-3215(2)(A)(i) (2013) (specific rule of consecutive sentencing 
for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle during crime of violence).   
103 D.C. CODE § 22-407 (2013); see In re Z.B., 131 A.3d 351, 353 (robbery and threats do not 
merge).   
104 D.C. CODE § 22-2001 (2013); see Monroe v. United States, 600 A.2d 98, 99 (D.C. 1991) 
(armed robbery and kidnapping do not merge). 
105 D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(2)(a) (2015).  
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V. STATUTORY INJUSTICE & SECOND LOOKS 
 
What are the prerequisites of a (retributively) proportionate sentence?  This is 
arguably one of the most complex and contested issues in legal theory; however, it 
is also one that a jurisdiction’s political morality offers a relatively straightforward 
answer to, at least in broad strokes.106  At its most basic level, a proportionate 
sentence is one that tracks a defendant’s blameworthiness, which is a product of two 
general criteria: social harm and state of mind.107  Specifically, the general formula 
governing retributively-based proportionality assessments operates accordingly:  
 
(1)  the greater the severity of the social harm caused or threatened by the 
defendant, and  
(2)  the more culpable the defendant’s state of mind,108 
(3)  the more blameworthy he or she is, and 
(4)  the more punishment that he or she deserves.109  
 
Beyond that, we also tend to have a pretty good (though far from 
incontrovertible) sense of what makes different forms of conduct more or less 
blameworthy than one another: the extent to which they manifest a culpable 
disregard of the legally protected interests of others.110  To be sure, the precise 
mechanism through which this qualitative accounting of blameworthiness translates 
into quantitative determinations of sentence length is a metaphysical mystery.111  
 
106 For further discussion of and support for this idea, see Serota, supra note 9, at 1202–14 
(drawing on Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 1596 (2013)). 
107 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Already Punished Enough, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 82 (1990); and 
the sources cited supra note 9.  
108 To be more specific, there are four main criteria bearing on an actor’s psychological 
blameworthiness: (1) awareness of risk; (2) reasons for creating, disregarding, or failing to attend to a 
risk; (3) normative competence; and (4) situational control.  See Serota, supra note 9, at 1204–05 
(exploring these factors). 
109 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 700–04 (2005); Husak, supra note 9, at 454–55; see also Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s 
Proposed Distributive Principle of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other 
than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 5 (2003) (“By ‘punishment according to desert’ I mean 
punishment according to the offender’s personal blameworthiness for the past offense, which takes 
account not only of the seriousness of the offense but also the full range of culpability, capacity, and 
situational factors that we understand to affect an offender’s blameworthiness.”). 
110 See, e.g., Gideon Yaffe, The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance, 12 CRIM. L. 
& PHIL. 19 (2016); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. 
& PHIL. 137 (2008); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992); Jean 
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 12 (Wesley Cragg 
ed., 1992). 
111 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1835 (2012). 
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What we do know, though, is that people have a rough sense of which punishments 
are absolutely unjust (what is referred to as cardinal proportionality),112 as well as a 
much clearer sense of which punishments are comparatively unjust in light of the 
way we punish other offenses/offenders (what is referred to as ordinal 
proportionality).113 
So, with that backdrop in mind, let us now return to the question presented 
earlier: do we have reason to feel secure in the systemic proportionality of the long-
term sentencing judgments handed down by District courts?  Based upon the 
analysis of the preceding sections, I do not believe that we do—for three main 
reasons. 
First, the combined effect of statutory overbreadth and offense overlap 
authorizes District judges to impose extreme sentences in a surprisingly large 
number of situations involving conduct of comparatively minimal 
blameworthiness.114  How often have the District’s sentencing courts actually meted 
out punishments that exceed any reasonable conception of proportionality?  It is hard 
to be sure, and there are undoubtedly countervailing forces—including sentencing 
courts’ own views of justice—that counsel against it.  That said, there are also 
influential ideas engrained in our socio-legal culture—for example, the empirically 
suspect idea that increasing punishment severity effectively promotes 
deterrence115—that do motivate judges to make sentencing judgments extending far 
beyond the confines of justice. 116   And notably, there are no enforceable legal 
limitations in the District—aside from the U.S. Supreme Court’s lax interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment—to stop a judge from heading down that path.117 
 
112 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2), illus. (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
2017); NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE 
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 104–05 (1991).  Which is to say, the principle of 
retributive proportionality establishes “rough outer limits . . . beyond which penalties would be widely 
seen as clearly undeserved (i.e., either excessively severe or excessively lenient).” Richard S. Frase, 
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 368 (1997) (emphasis in 
original).  
113 See, e.g., Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 9; ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, DESERVED CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES, ch. 5 (2017).  For arguments that retributive justice has both comparative and 
noncomparative dimensions, and that the justice of the punishment one receives is a function of both, 
see Ronen Avraham & Daniel Statman, More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved 
Punishment Be Unjust?, 25 UTILITAS 316 (2013); Lee, supra note 109, at 711–14.  
114 See supra Parts III & IV. 
115 See sources cited supra notes 17–18. 
116 It should be noted that these ideas are also given voice in District criminal law.  See, e.g., 
D.C. CODE § 24-403.01(a)(2) (2019) (directing courts to impose a punishment that “affords adequate 
deterrence to potential criminal conduct of the offender and others”); Lloyd v. United States, 806 A.2d 
1243, 1250 (D.C. 2002) (applying deterrence principles to support adoption of expansive transferred 
intent liability).   
117 See supra note 60. 
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Second, where mandatory minima are introduced into the equation, District 
judges may have no choice but to impose disproportionate sentences.118  When 
combined with overbroad statutes, these one-size-fits-all penalties subject 
individuals who should not even be covered by a particular statute to sentences that 
are arguably only appropriate for the most blameworthy violators.119  On top of that, 
there is the compounding injustice that occurs in the face of overlapping—and non-
merging—penalty provisions of this nature.  Fortunately, the D.C. Code has 
comparatively fewer mandatory minima than many other jurisdictions. 120  
Nevertheless, the mandatory minima applicable to the District’s overbroad—and 
broadly applicable—weapons enhancements by themselves reach a significant 
amount of criminal activity, both on their own and in conjunction with general 
principles of legal accountability.  
Third, and perhaps most subtle (though just as important), is the inevitability of 
comparatively disproportionate sentences.121  This is due to the twofold realities 
that: (1) in many cases, judges are left with sweeping low-to-high-end discretion in 
the calibration of a criminal sentence; and (2) that discretion operates in the absence 
of much, if any, direction concerning how to account for morally salient distinctions 
between offenders.122  This broad delegation is problematic because we have little 
 
118 See supra Part III; see also, e.g., Moorer v. United States, 868 A.2d 137, 140 (D.C. 2005) 
(trial court, in applying the District’s carjacking offense, observed: “I do not believe that this is a case 
that warrants seven years of mandatory time.  I believe it to be completely disproportionate to the facts 
of this case, but I am a judge bound to apply the law, and I will apply it.”). 
119 It is worth noting that this may have been a feature (rather than an unexpected byproduct) of 
these statutes given legislative adherence to principles of incapacitation and deterrence in the District—
both locally and federally—during the second half of the twentieth century.  See, e.g., FORMAN, supra 
note 22, at chs. 1, 7 (describing incapacitative goals motivating enactment of D.C. gun and drug 
legislation); Barkow, supra note 17, at 219–26 (providing the same with respect to comparable federal 
legislation).   
120 In this sense, the District’s carjacking and first-degree murder statutes are at least somewhat 
exceptional.   
121 This paragraph focuses on systemic bases for comparative disproportionality in the District.  
However, there are also many obvious localized problems.  Consider, for example, that the statutory 
maximum governing the most heinous assault, short of death, is 10 years under District law, which is 
the same statutory maximum facing someone who steals, or attempts to destroy, property worth more 
than $1,000.  D.C. CODE § 22-404.01 (2013) (aggravated assault); D.C. CODE § 22-3212 (2016) (theft); 
D.C. Code § 22-303 (2013) (malicious destruction of property).  Conversely, under District law, a 
person who merely threatens bodily injury will confront up to 20 years of imprisonment, while someone 
who possesses any amount of a controlled substance with intent to distribute will confront up to 30 
years of imprisonment.  D.C. CODE § 22-407 (2013) (felony threats); D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(a)(2)(A) 
(2015) (possession with intent to distribute). 
122 To be sure, the District’s voluntary sentencing guidelines provide a kind of guidance (albeit 
unenforceable) by calibrating the sentencing ranges for individual offenses with prior criminal history.  
See D.C. SENT’G AND CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2.3 
(2019).  However, this binary, grid-like approach simply leaves it to courts to determine the 
comparative penal import of a wide array of mitigating and aggravating factors that fall within an 
overbroad offense definition.  See Serota, supra note 9, at 1218–19. 
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reason to believe that individual sentencing judges acting on their own accord will 
carry out this undertaking in a uniform way—let alone carry it out at all.123  And this 
is to say nothing of the roadblocks that harsh mandatory minima pose to the pursuit 
of comparatively proportionate sentences—that is, they may set the statutory 
baseline so high that judges are either unable or unwilling to individualize a sentence 
to reflect material distinctions in blameworthiness between offenders, based on 
variances in social harm and/or state of mind.124  
These are only three of the most direct legal bases for questioning the systemic 
proportionality of the District’s sentencing scheme.  Yet there are many other 
indirect, structural bases that are similarly worrisome and thus worth mentioning.  
Perhaps most significant (and well-documented) is the corrosive incentive that 
mandatory minimum punishments create for innocent actors to enter guilty pleas.125  
 
123 This is so for at least two reasons.  First, the confounding influence of utilitarian principles 
may lead some courts to treat factors that mitigate blameworthiness as aggravating punishment.  For 
example, courts, relying on theories of incapacitation and deterrence, might impose more severe 
sentences in light of a defendant’s immaturity, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or diminished 
capacity (in its diminished responsibility form).  See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the 
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).  Second, the well-documented 
variances between sentencers in their overall severity suggests that even courts that singularly focus on 
doing justice would still likely hand down comparatively disproportionate sentences.  See Serota, supra 
note 9, at 1213; Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 9, at 1854–55. 
To illustrate, consider the following scenarios: 
(1)  D1 commits vehicular theft and is sentenced by J1 to 10 years in prison.  J1 is a 
severe sentencer who believes that intentional murder should be subject to 40 years 
in prison, and that intentional aggravated assault should be subject to 20 years in 
prison. 
(2)  D2 commits aggravated assault and is sentenced by J2 to 10 years in prison.  J2 is a 
moderate sentencer who believes that intentional murder should be subject to 20 
years in prison, and that vehicular theft should be subject to 5 years in prison. 
(3)  D3 commits intentional murder and is sentenced by J3 to 10 years in prison.  J3 is a 
lenient sentencer who believes that aggravated assault should be subject to 5 years in 
prison, and that vehicular theft should be subject to 2.5 years in prison.  
In each of these cases, the sentence meted out seems fair in light of that judge’s sentencing patterns.  
Between cases, however, variances in judges’ overall sentencing severity lead to the imposition of 
identical punishments for acts of widely varying blameworthiness, thereby producing a distribution of 
punishment that is ordinally disproportionate when the sentences are viewed in light of one another. 
124 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463 (2004).  This is at least generally reflected in the fact that the sentences in many cases involving 
mandatory minima often track the minimum punishment.  Memorandum #28 from the D.C. Crim. Code 
Reform Comm’n to Advisory Group Members (Oct. 21, 2019) https://ccrc.dc.gov/node/1438011 
(finding that, between 2009 and 2018, the median sentences for carjacking, armed carjacking, and 
murder simply reflect the 7-year, 15-year, and 30-year mandatory minima governing those offenses). 
125 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 15; Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 67–69 (2010); Scott Hechinger, How Mandatory Minimums Enable Police 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/opinion/mandatory-
minimum-sentencing.html. 
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And the same is almost surely true of the comparatively high statutory maxima 
arising from the District’s overbroad and overlapping offenses.  For even in the 
absence of a mandatory extreme sentence, a prosecutor’s ability to threaten the 
prospect of one leaves defendants with a difficult choice between pleading down to 
some less disproportionate charge(s), or risking the possibility of serving decades—
if not a lifetime—in prison, even in cases in which the defendant may not have 
actually committed the offense. 
To be sure, all of the above problems hinge upon prosecutorial charging 
decisions, in which case one could argue that the sound exercise of government 
discretion constitutes a failsafe.  However, neither the relatively scant published 
judicial opinions reflecting USAO-DC’s actual charging decisions, nor the manner 
in which the Office has comported itself in lobbying against the Second Look 
Amendment Act, provides much of a basis for placing one’s faith in the perennial 
“trust us” retort.126  And that is to say nothing of the ever-expanding scholarly 
literature on the influence of implicit (racial) bias on legal decision-making, which 
provides good reason to be skeptical of affording even the best-intentioned 
government actors the kind of discretion outlined above.127 
What the District is therefore left with is a sentencing system that routinely 
authorizes, and sometimes requires, the imposition of disproportionate, decades-
long punishments.  Which is not to claim that all—or even most—of the sentences 
meted out by the District’s criminal justice system are, in fact, disproportionate.  But 
it is to question the likelihood that the District’s long-term sentences are 
proportionate over time and across cases.  And that is significant.  Because for those 
who believe that aligning punishment with blameworthiness is a critical goal of 
criminal sentencing, this epistemic uncertainty—and the concomitant possibility of 
systemic disproportionality—materially alters the normative calculus surrounding 
adoption of second-look sentencing.  That is, instead of creating a mechanism for 
disrupting justice, second-look review may instead provide courts with an important 
opportunity to materially diminish the overall level of disproportionality in the 
criminal justice system, while at the same time maximizing important utilitarian 
values—such as rehabilitation, familial and community reintegration, and the 
efficient use of incarceration—through measured sentencing reductions. 
Implicit in this argument is an acknowledgement that the judicial reevaluations 
authorized by second-look sentencing will rarely be pristinely executed on strictly 
 
126 See also DEP’T OF JUST., JUST. MANUAL § 9-27.300 (“Once the decision to prosecute has been 
made, the attorney for the government should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable 
offenses.  By definition, the most serious offenses are those that carry the most substantial guidelines 
sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.”). 
127 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22; see also Michael Serota, Mens Rea, Criminal 
Responsibility, and the Death of Freddie Gray, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 31, 39 (2015) 
(“In the absence of a coherent legal framework that provides an intelligible basis for making the critical 
distinctions in mens rea, it seems highly likely that arbitrary and discriminatory factors could be used 
by decisionmakers—whether consciously or unconsciously—to fill in the gap.”). 
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retributivist terms.  In theory, second-look review provides temporally distant and 
structurally independent courts an opportunity to take a clear-eyed look at the 
proportionality of a sentence, insulated from the punitive pathologies and 
predisposition toward severity that so often distort penal decision-making.  Yet there 
is no guarantee that a later-in-time sentencer will be able to identify a perfectly 
proportionate sentence (as opposed to one that is simply less disproportionate128), or 
will be entirely free of the influence of these dynamics, a decade or more after the 
fact.129 
Nor, for that matter, should we expect judges to single-mindedly focus on 
furthering the principle of retributive proportionality during second-look review.  
After all, both actual and model second-look provisions explicitly invite judges to 
consider utilitarian ends in determining whether to grant a petition for a sentencing 
reduction. 130   And while distributing sentencing reductions in accordance with 
desert may be the best way to increase public safety in the long run (the theory of 
“empirical desert” 131 ), that is not necessarily the position those implementing 
second-look review will endorse.132  So it is only inevitable that courts—relying, for 
example, on the principle of dangerousness, rather than empirical desert—will on 
occasion withhold or award reductions in a manner that conflicts with the principle 
of retributive proportionality.133 
 
128 For example, it may be clear that any of the principal or supporting actors who received a 
mandatory minimum sentence for armed carjacking or felony murder under District law in the kinds 
of mitigating circumstances enumerated above received a disproportionately severe sentence.  See 
supra Part III.  But it may also be difficult to determine what a reasonably proportionate sentence would 
look like given the difficulty of reconstructing the factual circumstances and the ordinal ranking of 
punishments imposed more than a decade ago (among other reasons).  See supra notes 114, 123.  
129 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6, cmt. at 567 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017) (noting the potential for “disparity in outcomes” in second-look sentencing due to 
“the idiosyncrasies of individual judges” and the “politically charged” nature of cases that “will by 
definition include the most serious offenses and the most blameworthy offenders”). 
130 See D.C. CODE § 24-403.03(a)(2), (c) (2019) (making utilitarian considerations, such as 
dangerousness, rehabilitation, and familial and community circumstances, central to judicial inquiry); 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6(4) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 2017) 
(recommending judicial inquiry be based on revised statement of sentencing purposes, § 1.02(2), which 
incorporates utilitarian considerations); cf. Robinson, supra note 109, at 5 (explaining why, in theory, 
there should be few instances “in which the distribution of punishment will be guided by a principle 
other than desert” under the revised MPC statement of sentencing purposes). 
131 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT (2013) 
(arguing, based on relevant social science literature, that a distributive principle of blameworthiness 
proportionality is the most effective utilitarian crime-control device).    
132 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70–73 (2005) 
(highlighting the central role of narrow utilitarian considerations in state and federal sentencing).  
133 See also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6, cmt. at 576 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017) (noting that, in a second-look evaluation, “the unserved balance of an applicant’s 
prison sentence might be justified on the reasonable belief that the offender presents a continuing 
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And yet, in the final analysis, the central policy question confronting second-
look reform is not whether judicial sentencing reductions will perfectly, or 
uniformly, promote retributive proportionality in all cases.  Instead, it is whether the 
reductions (across cases): (1) materially decrease the overall level of 
disproportionality reflected in the criminal justice system; and (2) on balance, 
improve overall societal welfare.  It is not hard to imagine how reevaluating the costs 
and benefits of a long-term sentence alongside a decade or more of new information 
about an inmate’s rehabilitative state and risk of recidivism—and in light of relevant 
criminological advancements—could promote the latter set of welfarist interests, 
given the forward-looking nature of the utilitarian calculus. 134   But given this 
Essay’s analysis of the penal import of flawed crime legislation in the District, 
second-look reform may also afford judges with a valuable opportunity135 to both 
 
danger to the community,” such that “the original sentence should remain undisturbed on incapacitation 
grounds”). 
On the other hand, in at least some situations, sentencing reductions based on criteria unrelated 
to an actor’s blameworthiness at the time the crime was committed—for example, effective 
rehabilitation—may actually find support in community sentiment.  See Paul H. Robinson et al., 
Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, 
and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 820 
(2012) (finding that post-offense, pre-sentencing mitigation based on rehabilitation has “significant 
support,” “can carry with it a substantial reduction in punishment,” and “becomes more attractive, not 
less, as offense seriousness increases”). 
134 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6, cmt. at 569–70 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017).  Which is not to ignore the numerous costs implicated by second-look 
sentencing—for example, its “effects on finality, consumption of governmental resources, potential 
political divisiveness, and other[s].”  Ryan, supra note 1, at 158.  Indeed, these are of significant 
concern.  Cf. Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 
427–30 (2011) (exploring “rule of law” costs inherent in abrogating stare decisis).  But as others have 
argued, ultimately the “numerous, valid grounds for sentence modification must be accommodated, to 
avoid the injustice and waste of sentences that no longer fit the crime and/or the offender.” Richard S. 
Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT. R. 194, 
201 (2009).  See Ryan, supra note 1, at 161 (“This position appears to represent a consensus among 
legal commentators on the issue.”); see also Berman, supra note 2, at 152 (arguing that “history 
combines with modern mass incarceration in the United States to call for policy-makers, executive 
officials, and judges now to be less concerned about sentence finality, and to be more concerned about 
punishment fitness and fairness . . .”). 
135 And this is so regardless of age: although the SLAA would only extend second-look review 
under the IRAA to those younger than 25 at the time of conviction, the analysis in this Essay is not so 
limited.  Immaturity is surely an important consideration for purposes of retributive proportionality; 
however, it’s just one form of mitigation for which District sentencing may fail to appropriately 
account.  See supra Part III.  Of course, there may be good utilitarian reasons to take a more incremental 
approach.  For example, given limited resources, political sensitivities, and/or the prospects of 
successful rehabilitation, it may very well make pragmatic sense to focus on, or begin with, those who 
were younger than 25 when sentenced for legislative purposes.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, Freeing 
Morgan Freeman: Expanding Back-End Release Authority in American Prisons, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. 
& POL’Y 9, 46–47 (2014) (discussing pragmatic considerations relevant to second-look reform).  At the 
very least, though, it is a decision that should be made carefully, particularly in light of the analytical 
context provided in this Essay. 
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identify and remediate situations of clearly discernible retributive injustice in cases 
involving the most extreme sentences.136 
Which raises a broader question: just how generalizable is this Essay’s analysis 
of crime legislation and sentencing proportionality within the District to the prospect 
of undertaking second-look sentencing reform outside of the District?  That largely 
depends upon the extent to which the criminal codes of other jurisdictions contain 
problems similar to those explored above.  In this regard, my experience analyzing 
nationwide crime legislation, as well as the scholarly literature on criminal code 
reform, indicate that the District is by no means an outlier.137  Rather, the threefold 
flaws of statutory overbreadth, mandatory minima, and offense overlap seem to 
pervade criminal codes around the country.138  What’s more, the District appears to 
have a relative dearth of mandatory minima, which renders the likelihood of 
statutorily mandated injustice arising under the D.C. Code materially lower than 
might be the case in other jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, there certainly are features of the District’s local crime 
legislation (and broader justice system) that, if not categorically distinct, may at least 
be distinctly disconcerting. 139   For example, many of the District’s frequently 
charged criminal statutes—robbery, kidnapping, and homicide, just to name a few—
combine low threshold elements with high statutory maxima in an 
uncharacteristically egregious manner.140  In many jurisdictions, the potential for 
disproportionality inherent in this large delegation of sentencing discretion would 
be safeguarded by legally enforceable sentencing guidelines; however, the District 
is also one of a comparatively small number of jurisdictions with sentencing 
guidelines that are wholly voluntary.141  That means the only legal limits on severe 
punishments in the District are the broad (and rarely enforced) strictures of the 
 
136 For more detailed explanations as to how the principle of retributive proportionality can be 
operationalized as the basis for making fact-specific determinations of sentencing severity, see VON 
HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 9; and sources cited supra notes 112, 113, 131.  And for discussion 
of how to reconcile potentially conflicting community and philosophical views on deserved punishment 
in this process, see Serota, supra note 10, at 1204–07. 
137 See, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 54; Luna, supra note 89. 
138 For a collection and excellent illustration of comparable legislative flaws arising in other 
jurisdictions, see BARKOW, supra note 15, at ch. 1. 
139 From a codification perspective, the D.C. Criminal Code may be a problematic outlier in 
other ways—for example, due to its failure to incorporate general culpability or defense provisions.  
See generally Memorandum #2 from the D.C. Crim. Code Reform Comm’n to Advisory Group 
Members (Dec. 21, 2016), https://ccrc.dc.gov/publication/advisory-group-memo-2-adoption-
comprehensive-general-part-revised-criminal-code.  This is one codification problem, among many 
others, that the legislative recommendations of the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission seek to 
remedy.  See infra note 144. 
140 See supra Parts III & IV. 
141 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005). 
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Eighth Amendment.142  Finally, in the event that a retributively unjust sentence is 
imposed in the District, there is comparatively little room for back-end relief because 
the District also happens to be one of a minority of jurisdictions that requires its 
prisoners (through Truth-in-Sentencing) to serve at least 85% of their sentences.143 
Viewed in context, then, there may be some ways in which the potential for 
disproportionate sentencing outcomes under the D.C. Code is more pronounced than 
in other jurisdictions, as well as at least one particularly important way—namely, 
the frequency of mandatory minima—in which that risk may be comparatively less 
significant.  But to the extent that there are material variances in these other 
jurisdictions’ criminal legislation and sentencing practices, these are likely 
differences in scale, rather than kind.  In which case the risk of retributive injustice 
arising under the criminal laws in other jurisdictions would also seem—for the 
reasons discussed in this Essay—to weigh in favor of affording a second look to 




For those who believe in the retributive ideal of proportionate punishment, the 
current state of criminal legislation in this country should be worrisome.  The three 
pervasive legislative flaws described above—statutory overbreadth, mandatory 
minima, and offense overlap—provide little reason to trust that the criminal justice 
system is distributing punishment in a manner that appropriately reflects the 
seriousness of offenders’ conduct and the blameworthiness of their accompanying 
state of mind.  Second-look policies afford one potentially fruitful pathway for 
identifying—and hopefully remedying—this injustice for those who receive the 
most extreme sentences. 
 
142 See Barkow, supra note 61. 
143 See Turner, supra note 26. 
144 To be sure, second-look sentencing is not the only means of addressing retributive injustice, 
inside the District or beyond.  Arguably, the most direct and effective way to ameliorate the 
disproportionality of a jurisdiction’s sentencing judgments is through revision of the criminal statutes 
upon which they’re based.  Fortunately, the D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission has been doing 
just that, steadily developing “comprehensive criminal code reform recommendations,” which include 
more “proportionate penalties,” for the D.C. Council.  D.C. CODE § 3-152 (2019).  One can only hope 
that these recommendations will become law for all of the reasons highlighted in this Essay.  See 
generally id. 
